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Abstract 
 
This paper develops an adaptive learning model under uncertainty that examines evolution of 
capital account polices over time and across developing regions. In the framework, countries’ 
past experiences and IMF programs influence policymakers’ beliefs about the impact of 
capital account liberalization on growth, under the ‘Mundell’s trilemma constraint. The 
model, calibrated to data for Africa, Latin America and developing Asia, reflects relatively 
well capital account policies adopted in 1980–2010. It shows that even more developed 
countries with liberalized capital accounts may revert to controls under large output shocks. 
The outcomes of capital account switches are better and closer to policymakers’ expectations 
in countries with the IMF programs, underscoring the role of complementarity of policies.  
 
 
Key words: Adaptive learning, dynamics of capital account policies, growth, IMF programs 
 
JEL classification: F43, O4, O43, O55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*African Development Bank Group, Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire.  
**Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, 10 Merton Street, Oxford, OX1 4JJ, UK 
                                                          
1 The authors thank Celine Allard, Fillipo Ferroni, Poonam Gupta, Roman Horváth, David Rosenblatt, and 
Bořek Vašíček for helpful comments. The paper was presented at the 3rd International Symposium in 
Computational Economics and Finance (Paris, April 2014). An earlier version was issued as a working paper at 
the William Davidson Institute. The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily reflect those of 
the African Development Bank. Corresponding author’s e-mail: z.bicaba@afdb.org 
 
2 
 
I. Introduction  
 
Africa, as other developing regions, has experienced a surge in private capital inflows since 
the early 2000s (Dorsey et al., 2008; AfDB et al., 2013). Large capital inflows and their 
sudden reversals can lead to inflation, growth and exchange rate volatility and even crisis. 
They thus require appropriate policies. Capital controls are one of the measures that can 
address capital flows volatility, but come with substantial cost (Edwards, 1999; IMF, 2013a).
2
  
 
How prepared are the African policymakers to make the most out of capital inflows while 
mitigating their cost? Until recently, managing volatile capital flows has not created a major 
policy challenge for the continent, not even during the global financial crisis (Kasekende et 
al., 2010).
3
 This is because the relatively stable foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows 
account for most of capital inflows. However, given the trend towards Africa’s deeper 
integration into the global financial markets, its frontier market countries are becoming 
increasingly vulnerable to global financial shocks (IMF 2013a). Effective management of the 
financial integration and the volatile capital flows is becoming a policy priority. 
 
This paper models the impact of uncertain growth outcomes on capital account policies in the 
adaptive learning framework. In this framework, policymakers choose capital account 
policies (liberalization or controls) while taking into account the net growth payoffs. Their 
choices are constrained by the ‘Mundell’s trilemma’ – the ability to reach only two goals 
among financial liberalization, fixed exchange rate and monetary autonomy. The model is 
simulated with parameters which reflect policymakers’ initial beliefs about the impact of 
capital account policies on growth and are updated each period for actual outcomes.  
 
The paper explores the ability of an adaptive learning framework to reflect capital account 
liberalization paths in Africa, Latin America and developing Asia. The impact of  policies on 
growth level and volatility has been widely debated. The views have changed over time:  
 
‘…The IMF once advocated the removal of all controls on outflows and inflows in the heydays of the 
Washington Consensus in the 1990s. The Asian Crisis of 1997-1998, however, initiated a slow process 
of conversion that culminated with the IMF’s recent decision to explicitly and openly support the 
imposition of controls on capital inflows.....’ (Jinjarak et al., 2012) 
 
The adaptive learning framework reflects relatively well countries’ paths of capital account 
policies. Even countries’ with liberalized account may introduce capital controls when hit by  
large output shocks. Finally, the model predicts policy switches more accurately when the 
IMF programs are included, underscoring the importance of complementarity of policies.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature and Section III presents 
key facts. Section IV outlines the model while Section V carries out policy analysis. Section 
VI studies the impact of IMF programs and Section VII concludes.  
 
II. The Literature Review 
 
The results of theoretical and empirical literature on the capital account policies and growth 
in developing countries are mixed (Prasad and Rajan, 2008). On the one hand, liberalizing 
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 The other measures are macro-prudential regulations, foreign exchange interventions and/or the policy rate. 
3
 Ncube et al. (2012) document the transmission channels from US to South Africa, which was one of the 
African countries impacted by the financial crisis through the portfolio flows channel.  
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capital flows can promote growth and employment through financial deepening and better 
allocation of resources (Kose, at al., 2009). On the other hand, financial liberalization raises 
uncertainty and can lead to excessive risk taking, resulting in more frequent financial crises 
(Tornell and Westermann, 2005; Brixiová et al., 2010). Predictions of the theoretical 
literature are also ambiguous. As Rancière et al. (2012) show, the productivity gains from 
allocative efficiency need to be balanced with losses from higher incidence of crises.  
  
Over time, policymakers’ views on capital account policies have evolved from favoring 
liberalization under the Washington consensus to recognizing usefulness of capital flow 
restrictions in specific circumstances. The global financial crisis reinforced the message that 
full capital account liberalization may not be the right goal for all countries at all times. In 
fact, IMF (2013b) acknowledges usefulness of capital account controls during a financial 
crisis or when the crisis is imminent. Studies show that depending on the shocks, either 
capital controls or liberalization can be optimal (Farhi and Werning, 2013). 
 
Africa has pursued gradual capital account liberalization. Regulations of capital flows are 
complex, with many restrictions. The capital account liberalization raises uncertainty about 
growth and other outcomes for several reasons. First, capital controls alter the overall 
economic environment, but the impact on incentives and outcomes will be known only with 
time. Second, capital flows raise exposure of the economy to external shocks. Third, due to 
their pro-cyclicality, capital flows exacerbate negative shocks to the domestic economy.  
 
The application of the adaptive learning framework to macroeconomic issues, and especially 
capital account policies, in developing countries has been scarce scarce. Building on the 
adaptive learning models of Bicaba and Coricelli (2014) and Buera et. al. (2011), this paper 
contributes to closing this knowledge gap.
4
 The adaptive learning framework is suitable for 
developing countries that receive severe and frequent shocks (e.g. conflicts, political crises, 
weather), impacts of which are difficult to predict. The structural weaknesses that permeate 
developing countries further destabilize the policymakers’ expectations.5 The paper is also 
related to the long-standing debate on rules vs. discretion in policymaking (Kydland and 
Prescott, 1977). The adaptive learning approach leaves room for discretion where 
policymakers can adjust their choices with new information and thus correct for past errors.  
 
The paper seeks to answer the following questions:  
(i) Does adaptive learning framework capture paths of capital account policies in 
developing regions, including the delayed liberalization in Africa?  
(ii)  When may countries with liberalized capital accounts introduce controls? 
(iii) How do IMF programs impact countries’ learning about capital account policies?  
 
III. Stylized Facts  
 
III.1. Policy uncertainty 
 
Policymakers in developing regions face a greater uncertainty than those in advanced 
economies regarding the impact of policies on growth. This is also shown in the discrepancy 
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 This model differs from Bicaba and Coricelli (2014) as follows: (i) it analyzes developing countries, (ii) it 
includes the impact of IMF programs, positing that developing countries can learn from their IMF interactions; 
(iii) it includes the period of the latest (2009) global financial crisis and its aftermath.  
5
 The importance of adaptive learning for capital account management has been found in Prasad and Rajan 
(2008) who posit that countries will liberalize their capital account when the risks of doing so are low. 
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between the forecast and actual growth in 1990 – 2011 (Table 1). Such uncertainty makes the 
learning framework relevant for Africa and developing countries in general.       
 
Table 1. Estimates of bias forecasts of GDP 
  1990 - 2011 1990 - 2011 (without outliers) 
  (percentage points) 
Advanced Economies 0.07 0.10 
Africa -0.77 -0.43 
Developing Asia -0.02 0.18 
Latin America -0.24 -0.12 
Source: Genberg and Martinez (2014).  
 
III.2 Increased capital account openness  
 
The capital account openness is measured with the de facto and the de jure indicators. The 
“de facto” openness is the sum of capital inflows and outflows relative to the GDP, while the 
“de jure” openness covers regulations.6 In Africa, the de jure openness is outpacing the de 
facto one, as countries have been experiencing liberalization without financial integration. 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of the regional share of capital account liberalization 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Shrindler (2009) database. 
  
We consider an economy to be liberalized when both the de facto and the de jure indicators 
of capital openness show so. The periods of de facto capital account liberalization are 
constructed by identifying the episodes of major capital inflows (i.e. important changes in the 
trend of capital inflows).
7
 According to this criterion eighteen (18) African economies 
liberalized their capital accounts as of 2012. Africa exhibits overall trend towards capital 
                                                          
6 As in Chinn and Ito (2008), this variable is obtained from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Restrictions. Specifically, it is obtained through the first standardized principal component of 
the variables that indicate (1) the presence of multiple exchange rates, (2) restrictions on current account 
transactions, (3) on capital account transactions, (4) and the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. 
7 The date of structural break is identified through Andrews-Zivot test and the multiple structural breaks test. 
The ‘de facto’ index signals the year when a country has liberalized. To avoid the potential false signals of 
liberalization, the Andrew-Zivot identification is supplemented by a threshold analysis. Therefore, a country is 
financially liberalized at year t if total capital inflows has a trend break at or before t and there is at least one 
year with a capital inflows-to-GDP ratio greater than 5% at or before t (see Rancière et al. 2006). 
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account liberalization (Figure 1), but the speed of liberalization differed across countries. For 
example, Mauritius and Zambia fully liberalized in the early 1990s, but Angola, Tunisia and 
Tanzania kept strong restrictions in place during 1995-2005.
8
  
 
III.3 Factors impacting capital account liberalization 
 
Several factors can explain capital account liberalization. Key among them are (i) restrictions 
due to the Mundell’s impossible trinity and (ii) uncertainty about growth benefits of 
liberalization.
9
 The scope for liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s has been limited by the 
‘fear of floating’ and by rules and convergence targets of various regional economic zones. 
The acceleration of capital account liberalization in Africa during the early 2000s may be 
related to debt relief and the associated conditions under the IMF programs. 
 
a. Mundell’s trilemma 
 
Figure 2. Evolutions of Mundell’s Trilemma in Developing Regions, 1970 - 2010 
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Figure 2b. Developing Asia    Figure 2c. Latin America 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2012) database. In this case, the indices range 
from 0-1 and consitute weighted average for Africa. The origin represents zero monetary independence, pure 
float, zero international reserves, and financial autarky. 
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 Capital account restrictions in Tunisia and Tanzania did not change during 1995 - 2005. Tanzania partially 
liberalized capital account in the 1990s but retained restrictions on portfolio investment. Angola has re-imposed 
some restrictions on FDI inflows in 2003, but removed restrictions on direct investment liquidation in 2004. 
9
 The Mundell’s trilemma (impossible trinity) posits that a country can achieve only two policy objectives out of 
financial integration, exchange rate stability and monetary independence (Aizenman, 2011). Three indexes are 
used to describe the trilemma, ranging from 0-1. Higher values of exchange rate stability index indicate more 
stable movement of the exchange rate against the currency of the base country (Aizenman et al., 2012). 
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In Africa, outside of the countries which entered common monetary areas (WAEMU, 
CEMAC and CMA), the goal of monetary independence was an important constraining 
factor. This reflects a relatively high frequency of shocks in Africa that independent monetary 
policy can help mitigate. African policymakers in low income countries also value exchange 
rate stability. In contrast, capital account liberalization was the least important factor in 
Africa’s trilemma configuration (Figure 2).  
 
b. Uncertain growth payoffs  
 
Capital account liberalization involves trade-offs between higher longer term growth due to 
improved allocative efficiency and lower growth related to financial crises and the 
uncertainty that they bring about.
10
 Rancière et al. (2006) posit that over the long run, the pro-
growth effects of financial deepening outweigh the negative effects of crises.  
 
Table 2. Financial crises, capital account openness, and growth, 1970 - 2010 
 Capital Account Status Open economies 
 Open Closed Difference 
a
 After  Before  Difference 
a
 
Real GDP per capita growth (percent) 1.896 0.694 1.201** 1.424 0.622 0.802
c
 
Real investment growth (percent 
points) 
0.2029 0.009 0.194 0.002 -0.0735 0.0755 
Growth volatility (Standard deviation) 8.894 5.439 2.673** 10.421 4.449 2.342*** 
Current account balance (% GDP) -5.442 -6.381 -0.939*** -3.952 -6.158 -2.469*** 
Crises (frequency) 0.025 0.095 -0.070*** 0.035 0.131 -0.096*** 
Terms of trade volatility (Standard 
deviation) 
26.323 49.19 1.869*** 21.074 47.970 2.276 *** 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. Note: (*), (**) and (***) indicate that statistics are significant at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively, and ‘c’ indicates that statistics are above but close to 10%. (a) The test of volatility difference 
uses the ratio of variances.  
 
Table 3. Capital account regime and growth cost of financial crises  
 
Capital Account Status  
 
Open 
 
Closed  
Open economies 
After  before  
Crises -5.366 -0.360 -5.366 0.106 
Currency crises 0.434 0.187 0.434 0.244 
Banking crises -9.251 -0.054 -9.251 -0.254 
Debt crises  -4.211 -2.253 -4.211 -1.211 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB and World Bank databases. Note: The growth cost is 
computed by taking the average growth during the 4 years after the financial crisis occurred (the crisis year is 
included). Any type of financial crisis (debt, currency or banking crises) is considered. 
 
In Africa capital openness is associated with higher longer term growth than capital controls, 
despite cost of financial crises (Table 2 and 3). Capital controls have not reduced Africa’s 
financial fragility. In fact, financial crises have been more frequent in countries with closed 
than liberalized accounts.
11
 However, crises that occurred after liberalization tend to be 
severe and more costly in terms of per capita growth than crises before liberalization.  
                                                          
10
 Clearly, besides capital account policies other factors impact growth outcomes. Since the impact of capital 
account policies is still subject of discussions, we focus on this topic.   
11
 These observations can be explained by composition of capital flows. FDI inflows, which are relatively stable, 
have comprised most of the capital flows to Africa, while the more unstable portfolio flows have been sparse. 
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c. IMF programs 
 
As already underscored in Joyce and Noy (2008), IMF programs are not systematically 
associated with capital account liberalization. This is confirmed by analysis of specific IMF 
programs which shows that some types of programs (SBA and EFF) had a negative (and 
statistically significant) impact on capital account openness in Africa (Table 4).  
 
Table 4. IMF programs and capital account openness 
  Africa Latin America  Developing Asia 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
                    
SBA5[t-3,t+3] -0.176*** 
  
-0.151*** 
  
-0.224*** 
  
 
(0.0180) 
  
(0.0417) 
  
(0.0470) 
  PRGF5[t-3,t+3] 
 
0.0848*** 
  
0.280*** 
  
0.106** 
 
  
(0.0210) 
  
(0.0624) 
  
(0.0531) 
 EFF5[t-3,t+3] 
  
-0.148*** 
  
-0.133*** 
  
-0.0746 
   
(0.0298) 
  
(0.0456) 
  
(0.0618) 
Observations 1,352 1,352 1,352 589 589 589 391 391 391 
N 44 44 44 19 19 19 13 13 13 
Fixed effects and 
constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table shows the results of a linear probability 
model linking capital account openness and IMF programs. This model controls for individual effects. SBA5 is a dummy 
variable for IMF Stand-by-Arrangement in effect for at least 5 months in a particular year. PRGF5 is a dummy variable for 
IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Arrangement in effect for at least 5 months in a particular year. EFF5 is a 
dummy variable for IMF Extended Fund Facility Arrangement in effect for at least 5 months in a particular year. 
 
IV. The Model  
 
This section presents a model in which policymakers update their beliefs about growth 
impact of capital account policies. The beliefs are also impacted by the adoption of IMF 
programs. These beliefs then in turn impact policymakers’ choices of capital account policies.  
 
IV.1 The Environment 
 
The choice of capital account policies consists of two options – to either liberalize capital 
account or impose controls. Policies are chosen every period, so as to maximize the expected 
level of per capita GDP. 
 
Let it denote indicator at time t,  1,0it ,  where 1it  when policymakers in country i 
choose capital account liberalization and 0it  when they adopt capital controls. In this 
model, the payoff associated with each policy option comprises a benefit and a cost. Denoting 
itY  to be the per capita GDP in country i at time t , 1loglog  ititit YYy  is the growth rate. 
Policymakers, who have their jobs for one period, choose it  to solve: 
  
 
 ititititit
it
ZYEUMax 

 

log1
1,0
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Further, ‘stronger capital accounts’ and accumulation of international reserves prior to the global financial crisis 
have increased Africa’s resilience to external shocks (Elhiraika and Ndikumana, 2007).  
8 
 
s.t.       it
A
iit
L
iit
A
itit
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ititit yyy   11    (1) 
          
  ititi
m
it
m
i
e
it
e
i aTaTa  
 
where itZ ,  is the cost of capital account liberalization and 1itE  denotes expectations. 
Further,   ,0Nit  and  2,0  Nit  . The maximization is subject to (i) policymakers’ 
perceived relationship between capital account policy choices and GDP growth and (ii) the 
constraint imposed by the Mundell’s trilemma. Policymakers solve the problem given 
equation (1) as if these beliefs will not change in the future. 
  
The policymakers’ perceptions about relationship between policy choices and GDP growth 
are derived from payoffs associated with each policy option. Specifically:  
 
Capital liberalization option, with payoffs:     tdt
dt
Yd
ty Li
L
i
L
itL
i  
)(log
 , and 
Capital control option, with payoffs:        tdt
dt
Yd
ty Ai
A
i
A
itA
i  
)(log
 
 
where ity  is the observed GDP per capita growth, 
L
ity  and 
A
ity  are the growth rates attributed 
to liberalization and capital control policies respectively, and 
L
i   and 
A
i are the perceived 
effects of capital account liberalization and control in country i, respectively. From the 
payoffs, policymakers form beliefs about the dynamics of GDP per capita growth as follows:  
 
    it
A
itit
L
itit
A
itit
L
ititit yyy   11    (2) 
 
Equation (2) implies that policymakers perceive capital account policies to be a linear 
function of the real GDP per capita growth. it  denotes errors in the policymakers’ 
perceptions or the unexplained part of growth. The errors arise because capital account 
policies are not the only sources of growth and the policymakers do not know the exact 
effects of each capital account policy. In choosing policies, the policymaker considers also 
the relative cost (in terms of growth) of capital openness relative to capital controls.  
 
The costs associated with capital account liberalization, itZ , can be described as: 
 
 2,0; iitititit NuuFZ       and itit KF      (3) 
 
with a deterministic part, itF , a stochastic part itu ; K are the determinants of the cost of 
policy and parameters   describe how these determinants are related to policy costs. The 
dispersion of the unobserved component of costs is country specific (   2iituVar  ), 
reflecting that countries have different degrees of resilience to unobserved negative shocks.  
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The decision to liberalize capital account is constrained by the Mundell’s trilemma, that is by 
the exchange rate regime (
e
itT ) and the degree of monetary independence 
m
itT : 
 
  ititi
m
it
m
i
e
it
e
i aTaTa              (4) 
 
where  is a constant and homogenous target characterizing the policy constraints and it  
denotes a set of random shocks to the trilemma. These shocks are normally distributed with 
zero mean and with variance
2
 :  2,0  N . Moreover, the Mundell trilemma constraint 
 is the same across countries. However, the way domestic policymakers achieve the 
trilemma configuration varies i.e. jiandmekaa
k
j
k
i  ,, .   
 
Agents treat the parameters of their decision model as constant when they form decision 
rules, but update them according to actual observations. Thus, the timing of events is as 
follows: at the end of time t-1, policymakers in country i observe the past policy choices and 
the associated GDP growth rates, and update their beliefs about 
L
i   and 
A
i accordingly.  
 
IV.2. Equilibrium 
  
Policymakers arrive at an equilibrium decision rule for capital account policies by solving 
(4). They choose to pursue capital account liberalization policies (i.e. 1it ) if the expected 
gain in growth rates associated with this policy exceeds the cost.
12
 That is, 
 
      


 
 
Otherwise
TaTaZEEif it
m
it
m
i
e
it
e
iit
A
iit
L
iit
it
0
01 11    (5) 
 
The equilibrium policy rule is defined as the optimal time allocated to capital account 
liberalization (or to capital control).
13
 In equilibrium, policymakers’ expectations must be 
consistent with actual probability of liberalizing: 
 
        










 
222
1111



i
m
it
m
i
e
it
e
iit
A
iit
L
iitt
it
TaTaFEE
DE   (5’) 
 
where E is an expectation operator, 
1tD  is policy decision taken at t-1 ,   is a normal 
distribution function, and    AiitLiit EE  11    the expected gain from capital account 
liberalization.
14
  The probability that capital account liberalization policies will be adopted is 
high when policymakers are optimistic about the growth effect of these policies, that is when 
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 The proof of the existence of this equilibrium is available upon request from the authors. It is based upon the 
policy decision following a cutoff rule which is continuous and strictly monotonic in )(E . 
13 Assuming that the measure of countries is normalized to one, the share of countries dedicated to the policy 
option  1it  at time t, it , can be expressed as the probability that 1it  :    1Pr  ititit E  .
13
 
14
 This decision framework is similar to the rule derived in Buera et al., (2011) and Bicaba and Coricelli (2014). 
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 
    
0
1
11
1





A
iit
L
iit
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EEd
DdE


.     (6) 
 
The growth benefits of capital account liberalization are adjusted for the cost associated with 
complying with the Mundell trilemma. Specifically, 
e
ia and
m
ia  indicate the costs of fixed 
exchange rates and independent monetary policy, respectively. The constraint in (4) implies 
that for 0, 
m
i
e
i aa  probability of capital account liberalization decreases with the higher 
exchange rate stability. Policymakers in countries with fixed exchange regime are expected to 
prefer capital controls to liberalization. Similarly, a greater monetary independence lowers 
the chance  that policymakers would opt for capital account liberalization. 
 
IV.3 Learning 
 
In this model, we posit that for behavior of policymakers, especially in developing countries, 
rational expectations are a too strong assumption. Policymakers make errors, either in their 
expectations about workings of the economy or its parameters. Their expectations about the 
impact of policies on outcomes change over time. Likelihood of errors is even higher in 
Africa given the frequent shocks impacting the continent.  
 
We assume that policymakers do not know the exact effects of capital account liberalization 
on growth.
15
 Instead, they form expectations about the effect of each capital account policy 
option. Their perceptions are described by Equation (1). Since 
L  and A  are unknown, 
policymakers form initial beliefs about them. These priors are updated recursively, as:   
      
                                     
  
tttt
tttttt
XXPP
yyEyg
1
1
11
ˆˆ




 
    (7) 
 
where 1
~
t  -- derived as   11 ˆ   tttt XyyE   and   11 ~   tttt yyEy   -- is the perception error 
of policymakers at time t-1;  '1, tttX    is a vector collecting new data on results of 
capital account policies, and  11  tt   and  tt    denote the policymaker’s prior and 
posterior beliefs about β and 1 tttd  indicates changes in these beliefs, 
while
1'1   ttt XPg  describes the sequence of gains from learning. Finally,  is the 
variance-covariance matrix and P is the inverse of beliefs’ covariance matrix. In (7) 
parameter tg  describes ‘speed of learning’, or how quickly domestic policymakers adjust 
their expectations (perceptions) about the growth effects of capital controls or liberalization.
16
  
 
                                                          
15 Assuming uncertainty about the gains of capital account liberalization is plausible since robust support for 
large quantifiable benefits or costs of international financial integration has been missing (Rey, 2013). 
16
 As 0tg , agents perceive all changes as temporary and their model converges to the true data generating 
process of the economy: 1
ˆˆ
 tt   (see Buera et al., (2011) for the properties of tg ). 
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The timing is such that policymakers form their beliefs about the effects of liberalization (or 
no liberalization) at t-1. The decision to liberalize or not is taken based on these beliefs. 
These beliefs are updated at t with new information. Policymakers will switch to the 
alternative policy option in the presence of a large negative shock to growth. 
  
V. Results 
 
This section presents the results. Estimations are carried out with unbalanced panel data. The 
updating of policymakers beliefs is country-specific. 
 
V.1 Parameterization -- Policymakers’ initial beliefs 
 
To derive the initial beliefs of policymakers about the impact of capital account policies on 
growth, we consider a sample of 45 African countries during 1980-2010. Since the 
information on de jure capital account liberalization (i.e. regulations and policies) is limited 
to 2006, the ‘de jure’ measure is supplemented by the ‘de facto’ one for 2007 - 2010. This 
allows us to include the period of the global financial crisis. We also compare Africa’s 
experience with those of Latin America (19 countries) and developing Asia (18 
countries).
17
The initial policymakers’ priors using observed data from 1960-1980 (Table 5). 
In 1980, African policymakers viewed capital controls as optimal, since countries with capital 
controls posted higher growth that those that liberalized, i.e.
AL
00   . Moreover, a number 
(15) of Africa countries experienced debt crisis during 1980-1985, worsening the already 
negative perceptions about impacts of financial liberalization. 
 
Table 5. Estimates of prior beliefs 
 
Parameters 
 
Distribution 
Priors 
Whole 
sample 
Africa  Developing 
Asia  
LAC 
L   200 ,  LiLi N  0.02185 0.00949 0.03699 0.02965 
A   200 ,  AiAi N  0.01803 0.01630 0.01495 0.02178 
  
 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
f   2, fi fNf   0 0 0 0 
f   0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
a  Uniform  - - - - 
  Uniform  - - - - 
2   1.367e-07 2.458e-07 5.481e-08 4.310e-
08 
 yvar   6.731e-08 1.014e-07 3.473e-07 1.131e-
08 
  2/1
2
var









y
i
 
 vvi dsIGv ,  0.70166 0.64223 0.3973 0.51230 
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V.2 Cost of capital account policies 
 
In this section, we analyze determinants of cost of capital account liberalization, namely the 
level of development (GDP per capita), the degree of financial development, the occurrence 
of currency crises, and the stock of international reserves. While at the outset the priors of 
African policymakers were largely in favor of capital controls, policymakers in developing 
Asia leaned more in favor of capital account liberalization. The uncertainty about these priors 
(measured by variance) was higher in African countries than in the other regions. 
 
In this model, the costs are expressed in relative terms, that is as a proportion of GDP per 
capita growth. The parameters ( ) of the cost function ( ititit uKF   ) are estimated using 
the Maximum Likelihood Estimator. Once the decision rule of policymakers is formulated 
and their beliefs about the growth impact of each policy option ( Li   and 
A
i ) are obtained, a 
nonlinear probabilistic model is estimated. In addition, we control for countries fixed effects 
in order to account for cross country differences in capital account liberalization.  
 
Table 6 shows the posterior estimates of the cost parameters. Economic development 
(measured by GDP per capita) is a key determinant of cost of capital account liberalization. 
As countries develop and their institutions improve, they can open capital accounts without 
incurring high costs. The literature on the timing of capital account liberalization emphasizes 
that a developed banking system, effective prudential regulations, and sound institutions are 
prerequisites for countries to benefit from large capital flows (McKinnon 1993). 
 
Table 6. Determinants of the costs of capital account liberalization 
 Africa LAC Developing Asia 
Determinants of cost ( ) 1 2 3 
Currency crisis
 3, tt
 
-0.0001 0.0016 -0.0032 
 (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0027) 
Financial development -0.0270 -0.0023 0.0135 
 (0.0096) (0.0049) (0.0100) 
GDP per capita -0.0087 -0.0016 -0.0066 
 (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0045) 
Monetary constraints (a)    
Exchange rate stability  0.0084 0.0003 0.0047 
 (0.0026) (0.0016) (0.0045) 
Monetary independence  -0.0049 0.0033 0.0171 
 (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0092) 
Reserves over GDP -0.0329 -0.0426 -0.1431 
 (0.0082) (0.0212) (0.0253) 
Number countries    
N 45 19 18 
Note: This table reports the posterior estimates parameters of the cost function ( ) and the trilemma 
configuration )',(
m
i
e
i aaa  . In brackets are the standard deviations of these parameters. 
  
The second determinant is the financial development captured by the ratio of credit to 
domestic private sector over GDP. The results suggest that in African countries with a 
developed domestic financial system and financial markets’ friendly policies are on average 
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associated with a lower cost of liberalization. In contrast, when policymakers adopt capital 
account liberalization in a context of under-developed domestic financial system, they expose 
their economy to costly financial crises, as in Calvo and Mendoza (2000). The study by Aoki 
et al. (2010) shows the adjustment to liberalization of international financial transaction 
depends upon the degree of domestic financial development. For poor countries with weak 
policies and institutions, a key lesson is that capital account liberalization works well if 
implemented with other sound policies (Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2003) 
 
In Africa, the Mundell trilemma configuration differs from the configuration in other regions. 
In developing Asia, for example, a high degree of monetary independence increases the cost 
of liberalizing capital account. As a result, Asia’s policymakers are less likely to liberalize 
their capital accounts. Further, by increasing the stock of international reserves by 1% of 
GDP, African policymakers can reduce the potential growth cost of capital account 
liberalization. In other words, when the stock of reserves accumulated is high, policymakers 
perceive capital account liberalization as more beneficial in terms of growth. 
 
V.3 Model’s predictive quality 
 
This section examines whether learning has been an important factor in the dynamics of 
capital account policies in Africa and in other developing regions.  
 
Figure 6.  Predictive quality of the model 
 
6a. Africa 
 
6b. Latin America    6c. Developing Asia 
  
Note: This figure reports the predicted and actual share of liberalized economies in different regions. 
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Figure 6 reports the actual (solid) and predicted (dash line) shares of economies with 
liberalized capital account.
18
 It illustrates that the model predicts relatively well the very low 
share of African economies with liberalized capital accounts in the 1980s as well as the 
acceleration of liberalization in the early 2000s. The predictive quality of the model could be 
further analyzed by evaluating its behavior of the model in real time i.e., how the model 
tracks the actual changes in capital account policies.  
 
In Africa, About 50 percent of actual policy switches in capital account policies at time t in 
Africa are well predicted by the model, while about 60 percent of changes are well predicted 
at time t+2. The model performs even better in explaining the policy changes in developing 
Asia, since 62 percent of changes in policies are well predicted at t (without a delay). Finally, 
for Latin American countries, the adaptive learning framework does not perform as well in 
explaining the observed changes in policies. In fact, only 6 percent of capital account policy 
changes that occurred at time t are well predicted, without any delay, by the model (Table 7). 
 
Table 7. Measures of fit of the baseline model 
Predictive quality Africa Latin America Developing Asia 
Share of good prediction 0.9864 0.9442 0.9799 
Predictions in real time    
 At time t 0.5000 0.0625 0.6154 
 At time t+1 0.4545 0.3750 0.6154 
 At time t+2 0.5909 0.5625 0.7692 
Number of countries 45 19 18 
 
V.4 Learning and evolution of beliefs 
 
The difference between the perceived growth under capital account liberalization and under 
capital account controls (
A
t
L
t   ) is a key decision parameter for each policymaker. A 
positive difference indicates that policymaker perceives capital liberalization as preferred 
policy option to capital controls. Figures (7a) and (7b) depict the evolution of the most 
frequent difference (
A
t
L
t   ) i.e. the mode observed at time t. The lightest shaded areas 
correspond to the 10 - 90th percentiles of the distribution, while the darkest shade denotes the 
40 - 60
th
 percentiles. Until 1999 most African policymakers did not perceive liberalization of 
capital flows as an optimal policy in terms of growth effects, as 
A
t
L
t    remained negative.  
  
We analyze the accuracy of African policymakers’ expectations about the growth effects of 
policies, through evolution of the variance of 
A
t
L
t    over time, where a high variance 
means a high uncertainty of expectations. At the beginning of the 1980s, beliefs about the 
growth effects of each policy option were highly inaccurate, but adaptive learning contributed 
to improving the accuracy of expectations over time. The accelerated liberalization from the 
mid-1990s reflects better growth performance of liberalized economies (Figure 7a and 7b).  
 
                                                          
18
 The model-predicted values correspond to the sequence of one-step-ahead predictions of each specification. 
For instance, the value for 2000 in figure 6a represents what the model predicts for the share of economies with 
liberalized capital accounts in Africa, given the information on GDP growth and policies up to 1999. The value 
also assumes that in 2000 shock to the costs associated with capital account policies was zero for each African 
country. This follows from the condition (3) that  2,0; iitititit NuuFZ  . 
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Latin American policymakers were from the outset more positive about capital account 
liberalization than their African counterparts, and they kept this positive outlook over time. 
The accuracy of their forecasts also markedly improved over time (Figures 7c and 7d). In 
contrast, in developing Asia the preference for capital account liberalization has fallen in 
1980s, and only gradually increased afterwards.  
 
Figure 7. Africa: Evolution of beliefs about the effects of capital account liberalization 
 (a) Evolution of beliefs (expectations)  (b) Precision of beliefs (expectations) 
 
 
Latin America  
(c) Evolution of beliefs (expectations) (d) Precision of beliefs (expectations) 
 
 
Developing Asia 
(e) Evolution of beliefs (expectations)  (f) Precision of beliefs (expectations                                                               
  
Note: Figure (a) reports the mode of the difference between the expected growth under capital account 
liberalization and under capital control. Figure (b) reports the variance of this difference. This variance indicates 
the uncertainty about the beliefs. 
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The main difficulty in showing the role of IMF programs is that IMF loans tend to be made in 
response to economic problems. Participation in an IMF program is thus a joint decision 
between a member country and the IMF. Two reasons may explain why the traditional 
learning framework used in this paper changes 
 
VI. The Impact of IMF Programs 
 
The key challenge in showing the role of IMF programs in capital account policiesis is that in 
the presence of IMF programs the learning changes. First, the IMF programs can modify the 
policymakers’ perceptions about the net growth gains from capital account liberalization. 
Indeed, since IMF programs are often adopted when the economies are facing challenges, 
their adoption is motivated by the need for improvement. Second, IMF programs can directly 
decrease (or increase) the cost of capital account liberalization, as they are accompanied by 
conditionality (in terms of macroeconomic targets or structural benchmarks). 
 
A variable ( it ) captures the adoption (or not) of an IMF program  such that: 
  




Otherwise
adoptedprogramIMFif
it
0
1
   (8) 
The policymakers have the following options: (i) either they adopt liberalization with the 
IMF program, or (ii) liberalization without IMF program, or (iii) capital control with the IMF 
program (iv) or capital controls without IMF program (Table 9). 
 
Table 9. Matrix of policy options 
 Capital account policy 
IMF program ( 1it ) ( 0it ) 
( 1it ) 
 1,1z   0,1z  
( 0it ) 
 1,0z   0,0z  
 
The policymakers’ perceptions evolve as follows: 
 
  zitit
L
iit
A
iit zzy  
'' 1      (9) 
where 'Li  is belief about the effects of capital account under an IMF program and 
'A
i is 
policymaker’s belief under the alternative policy option. In Table 10, we recalculated the 
priors of policymakers about the growth effects of capital account policies in 1990. Under the 
IMF programs, African policymakers initially perceived capital account liberalization as 
damaging to growth. The least optimistic initial beliefs about future growth are observed for 
the policy option  1,1z  (i.e. liberalized capital account and the presence of IMF program) and 
the best initial perception is observed for the policy option  0,0z  (i.e. closed capital account 
and the absence of IMF program). 
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Table 10. Definition and derivation of priors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the priors are computed over the period 1970-1990. 
 
The main finding is that predictive quality of the model increases with the IMF programs. 
Figures (8a) and (8b) depict the evolution of beliefs for countries under IMF programs (8a) 
and for countries without such programs (8b).  First, there is a constant improvement in 
beliefs about future growth in favor of capital account liberalization. Even if they started with 
a weak economic situation, countries which adopted IMF programs and capital account 
liberalization have improved their perceptions. Second, the adoption of liberalization is faster 
with IMF programs, this could be due to perception, conditionalities or both. 
 
Figure 8. Evolution of beliefs: the role of IMF programs  
(a)       (b)     
 
Note: (a) beliefs under ‘open capital account and IMF programs’ vs. beliefs under ‘capital controls and IMF 
program’. (b) Beliefs under ‘opened capital account without IMF programs a’ vs. beliefs under ‘capital control 
without IMF program’. 
 
Finally, the learning model predicts more accurately capital account policy switches in 
countries with an IMF program than in countries without one. Indeed, the model successfully 
predicts 16 percent of policy switches contemporaneously and 41 percent of policy switches 
at t+1. In contrast, in countries without an IMF program, the model predicts only 5 percent of 
switches at time t and 15 percent at time t+1. In other words, policymakers learn more when 
there is an IMF program in place (Table 11). 
Parameters Distribution  Africa 
L : liberalized capital account and IMF program (  1,1z )  200 ,  LiLi N  -0.0235735 
Alternative   0.0067273 
A : Control without IMF program (  0,0z )  200 ,  AiAi N  0.0145313 
Alternative   -0.004278 
A : Control with IMF program (  1,0z )  200 ,  AiAi N  -0.0035649 
Alternative   0.0107821 
'L : Liberalized without IMF program (  0,1z )  2'0'0 ,  LiLi N  0.0111825 
Alternative   0.0061 
2   5.938e-07 
 yvar   2.057e-07 
 







2
var

y
vi  
 vvi dsIGv ,  0.5885364 
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Table 11. Predictive quality of the model in presence of IMF programs 
 Prediction of
 1,1z  Prediction of  0,1z  
Overall good prediction 0.933 0.94 
Prediction in real time of policy 
switches 
  
At t 0.1622 0.0488 
At t+1 0.4054 0.1463 
At t+2 0.2973 0.2439 
Note:  
 1,1z  is a binary variable   associated with liberalized capital account and the presence of IMF program 
and 
 0,1z  with liberalized capital account and the absence of IMF program. 
 
VII. Conclusions  
 
This paper explored interactions between growth and capital account policies in developing 
regions during 1980 – 2010, utilizing an adaptive learning framework. In this framework, 
policymakers choose capital account policies to maximize real GDP growth per capita, under 
uncertainty about the net growth payoffs. Their choices are constrained by the ‘Mundell’s 
trilemma’, that is the ability to reach only two policy goals among financial liberalization, 
fixed exchange rate and monetary autonomy. Policymakers update their beliefs about the 
impact of capital account policies on growth based on information obtained from actual 
growth outcomes and through IMF programs. The model was then initially simulated with 
parameters calibrated to data in Africa, Latin America and developing Asia during 1960 – 
1980. After that, the parameters were updated for actual outcomes every year.  
 
The adaptive learning approach reflects relatively well Africa’s path of capital account 
liberalization, including its delay in comparison with other regions.
19
 According to the model, 
the accuracy of policymakers’ beliefs about the impacts of capital account policies on growth 
has improved over time. One of the findings is that even countries’ with liberalized account 
could revert to capital controls in the presence of particularly large output shocks. Further, the 
outcomes of capital account switches are closer to policymakers’ expectations in countries 
with the IMF programs. However, IMF programs contain a number of policy measures 
besides changes in capital account regimes, pointing to the need for complementarity of 
policies. Capital account policies in Africa tend to change more often than in other regions, 
creating policy uncertainty for economic agents. This underscores the importance of building 
stronger policymaking institutions and rules in the region to mitigate this high volatility.  
 
Future research could utilize the adaptive learning framework to examine impact of other 
policies managing capital flows. The example includes the interactions of capital controls 
with instruments such as macro-prudential regulations, foreign exchange interventions and/or 
setting of the policy rate, and their impact on growth and other key macroeconomic variables.  
  
                                                          
19
 Other factors, such as limited capacity to establish conditions for capital account liberalization, played a role.  
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